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The UK should have waited to enforce austerity
Jonathan Portes and John van Reenen pick apart the arguments used to intially justify
austerity policies and argue that delayed fiscal consolidation would have been a far better
policy than immediate cuts.
When Britain’s coalit ion government announced its plan f or aggressive f iscal
consolidation on taking of f ice in May 2010, three key arguments were advanced by its
supporters.
The f irst was that there was no alternative: if  borrowing continued on its current track,
the gilts market would panic. In its extreme f orm, this was always scaremongering. But it
has been disproved by events even more thoroughly than most of  us expected. We are
now on course to borrow even more than was planned bef ore the austerity programme
was announced. Yet long-term interest rates in Britain are at historic lows just as they are
in virtually every industrialised country with monetary independence. This is the result of
low growth, not f iscal consolidation.
The second argument was that f iscal consolidation would help, or at least not derail, recovery. Again, this
relied more on f aith than economics. While we shouldn’t read too much into last week’s output f igures,
the UK economy is hardly thriving. Its weakness is in large part the result of  f iscal policy – the
International Monetary Fund estimates that this has reduced gross domestic product by about 2.5 per
cent so f ar.
The third, much more compelling, argument was that since, over the long run, the books have to balance,
f iscal consolidation was inevitable. So why delay the pain? This sounds logical. But it contravenes the
textbook prescription – f ollowed successf ully by the 1992-97 government – that def icit cutting should
f ollow, not precede, sustained recovery. The economic case f or delaying def icit reduction has been
powerf ully made by Brad Delong and Larry Summers, who argue that – given plausible assumptions
about the impact of  f iscal policy when economies are depressed, as opposed to “normal” t imes – this
would yield big medium to long-term benef its.
On August 3rd the National Institute of  Economic and Social Research (NIESR) publishes research that
attempts to put hard numbers on the economic impact of  immediate versus delayed f iscal consolidation
in the UK. We look at the impact of  implementing the same tax rises and spending cuts, only starting in
2014, when we assume the economy would have returned to “normal”. We also look at what would have
happened without any consolidation at all.
This af f ects the projections, f irst, because both short and long-term interest rates are currently very
low, so the response of  monetary policy to f iscal policy dif f ers a lot. Second, many UK households and
f irms are f inancially constrained right now because borrowing is dif f icult. Again, this makes f iscal policy
more potent. Finally, protracted high unemployment af f ects the supply side of  the economy in the
medium term. The long-term unemployed are less likely to look f or, or f ind, jobs, and may suf f er
permanent damage to skills and motivation. All these ef f ects are well known, but hard to incorporate in
standard models.
The results are striking. The modelling conf irms that doing nothing was not an option; our “no f iscal
consolidation” scenario leads to unsustainable debt ratios. So some pain was inevitable; under both our
“immediate consolidation” scenario and that of  “delayed consolidation”, def icit cutting worsens growth
and unemployment, just as it has done.
But our estimates indicate that the impact would have been much less, and less long- lasting, if
consolidation had been delayed until more normal t imes. The cumulative loss of  output over the period
2011-21 totals about £239bn in 2010 prices, or 16 per cent of  2010 GDP. And unemployment is higher f or
some two to f our years longer if  t ightening comes when the economy is depressed. So early t ightening
has real, large costs.
These are scenarios, not f orecasts. The choice of  2014 as a time when the economy would have
returned to normal is arbitrary and, in reality, global developments could well have changed that in any
case. But the research shows why, and how much, macroeconomic judgments matter.
The good news is that, in our model at least, the UK economy eventually returns to equilibrium whatever
the path of  consolidation. But in the long run we are all dead. This analysis shows that the economic pain
resulting f rom f iscal consolidation, while unavoidable, could have been substantially reduced by a
sensible application of  basic macroeconomic principles.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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